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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

J. HARO·LD MITCHELL,
Respondent,

vs.
ARROWHEAD FREIGHT LINES, L'TD.,
a corporation, and MAR\7JN C. VA·N
PATTEN,
Appellxunts.

Case No.
7·242

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTiS
STEWART, CANNON & HANS;ON
E. ·F. BAL'D·WIN, J·R.
Attorneys for DefendamJf).s
,OJI'IAl A ppellarnts
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT:S
ANNUITY TABLES
~Counsel acknowledges that there was no direct evidence in this case that there was any permanent mate~rml impairment ·of a swbstantiJal nature in p~laintiff's
etvrnim.g capacity as required under the Pauley case
before the annuity tables could he introduced in evidence. His only argument is that plaintiff's injuries
were of such nature that he might be unable to carry
· on his avocation as a school teacher. The sole handicap
argued was that he might be hampered in his ability
1

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to talk; howev.er, there is nothing in the evidence to
that effect. The fact that plaintiff admittedly was teaching Sunday school and singing in a choral group and
taking p art in the ordinary activities of life (Tr. 353)
proved to the contrary. This uncontradicted evidence
and plaintiff's ability to testify without difficulty at th~
trial shows ther.e is no merit to counsel's ·contention,
which is who~ly unsupported hy the evidence.
Of the seven doctors called to testify, five of whom
were called as plaintiff's witnesses, none testified that
plaintiff either was, or would he unable to resume his
occupation as a school teacher.
'The only statement of any lay witness on the matter
was that of plaintiff, who te·S'tified: "I didn't want to try
to continue my school work ~at the present !time. I just
simply feel like I couldn't handle it this year." (Tr.
332). P~aintiff was still planning on resuming his school
work at the time of the trial. This he never denied.
Plaintiff outlines at great length evidence relating
to his injuries, most of which had healed or were completely repaired ev.en at the time of trial. The only injuries which could permanently affect plaintiff's. earning cai>'acity· would necessarily have to he permanent imr
juries of such a nature and character as to be prohibitiv.e
of his resuming his occupation.
As a matter of fact, plaintiff began to resume his
ordinary activities as early as thirteen days after the
accident fol~owing that period of hospitalization. He
was attended for a short whiLe thereafter by Dr. Butler
at Safford, Arizona from April 22nd to May 16, 1947
1
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(Tr. 281). He had then recovered snfficientl~' that he
did not need the assistance of Dr. Butler to the tin1e he
left Safford June 1947, and finished all his routine \York
before he left .£_.Uizona ( Tr. 283). Other than tl1e fixing of his teeth, he thereafter required no further Inedical
attention than the exan1inations made by Dr. Richards
and Dr. Clegg.
In his enthusiasm, Counsel suggests such things as
arthritis. There was no evidence that plaintiff had even
a sign or trace of this disease, which normally comes
from age rather than trauma. The only m·ention or reference to arthritis was in the taking of Dr. But!ler's deposition at Safford, Arizona, which was read at the trial.
In that deposition, Dr. Butler had made a voluntary
statement that arthritis sometimes follows injury or
fractures involving a joint of a vertebrae-. Our objection
and motion to strike such voluntary statement should,
in our opinion, have been granted by the lower court
('See Tr. 272). We would have insisted further that
such reference to arthritis be stricken, hut the trial court
assured us the record was cleared up by the cross-examination developed in the deposition. W·e quote:
'' Q. But you did not see anything that indicated that ( refering to arthritis) in any of
his joints~
A. No, sir.
MR. CANNON: Now, at that point, your
Honor, we would likp to move to strike the
doctor's statement on Page 17, wher·ein he
referred to arthritis, since he now testifies
he found no arthritis.
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MR. WHITE : Of cours·e, your Honor, we
resist _the motion, as it is a condition which
may develop in the future according to the
doctor.
· MR. ·CANNON: That is }JUre speculation.
THE COUR.T: WeU, it's-that is just
part of your cross examination; it shows now
. that he hasn't amy. The motion is denied."
(Tr. 282-3).
Of all the doctors who examined plaintiff from t~e
beginning through the trial, none was able to discover
even a t:r:ace of arthritis. Of the numerous x-rays taken
~nd the physical examinati~ns made, including those of
Dr. Clegg and Dr. Broadbent, all were entirely negative
as to arthritis~
Plain tiff. himself made no such claim.
·The matter was undisputed.
P~ain tiff's claims of fractures in the vertebrae are
equally unfounded.- While it is true that Dr. Butler
suggested a fracture in the joint of the- first cervical~
verte hra:e, and this apparently was the basis of his conclusion as to any permanent injury to the· neek, we
pointed out in our original brief, and again here I!lention, that even if a fracture could have existed, (and
the sev~ral other doctors all testified there was none}
it was necessarily healed and repaired itself, and it is
entirely clear from the record that there was no permanent injury to the neck on account of the fractures.
The limitation of motion, if any, was. necessari~y based
on injury to ~the soft tissue.
Respondent emphasizes such things as impairment
of breathing. Plaintiff admitted testifying in his de4
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position that his breathing 'Ya.s '~pretty much all right
no,v,'' and added: '~It is quite definitely cleared up.''
(Tr. 344).
The careful and thorough examinations conducted
by Dr. Clegg at plaintiff's request, other than the Inoderate limitation of motion of the neck and jaws, sho,ved
a hBaled fracture of the left mandible, healed ·scar of the
left ear, area of anesthesia about the left ear and left
side of the chin, healed rib fracture, hBa[,ed fracture of
the nasal 'bone, and anklyosis, partial fibrous slight of
left thumb. (Tr. 290-1, 305). All ex-rays showed the
bony structures to be in good alignment and good apposition. ·The possibility of a chip fracture, the evidence
clearly shows, could not have affected or limited the
motion of plaintiff's neck.
We wish to correct the transcript page on page 15
of our brief, whereiJI reference is made to the testimony
of Dr. Broadbent where he says there was no evidence of
a skull fracture. The transcript page should 'be 22 5
rather than 223. _
So far as any permanent disabi~ity was concerned,
that was limited to the two possibilities, that of moderate
limitation of motion in the neck and jaws, s.o the question is really reduced to whether moderate limitation of
motion in the neck and jaws would prevent plaintiff from
resuming his occupation in the teaching p·rof.ession.
The demand for teachers at the present time is
great. We submit there is no evidence in this case
that plaintiff could not resume his occupation. The
evidence is that he was intending to do so.
1
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Similarly, no proof was offered by plaintiff as to
any permanent impairment of earning cap~acity as to
the ranch, and no claim of such proof was made at the
time of oral argument before this court. There was no
evidence that plaintiff had any earning capacity in connection therewith. Furthermore, if plaintiff intended
to restin1e his occupation as a teacher, he would not
then have n1ore time than to supervise or manage the
ranch. At 1east, there is no evidence but what that would
consume all his time, especially if he continued in such
community activities as teaching Sunday ,School and
singing with his choral group.
The original claim by plaintiff's amended complaint.
was $3,000 nece-ssitated by the employment of others on
the ranch (Tr. 23). The only evidence was that $'900
was paid a brother June to December the year of the
accident. How much of this would have 'been paid had
the accident not occurred was not shown. 'The disturbing feature, however, is how counsel just after the court
at the conclusion of the trial overruled our final motion
to strike the annuity tab~es and just as the instructions
were to he read to the jury, seized upon the opportunity
to quietly withdraw his claim for $900 wages paid. To
this procedure, we normally would have no objection;
however, we were led to believe that this item of special
damage was withdrawn because of lack of proof. In
withdrawing the $900 item, which ·counsel does no~ deny,
he could only have had two possible r,easons for so doing: Either he was thereby admitting there was no proof
· but that the $900 would have been p~aid notwithstanding
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the accident, or, secondly, it was a deliberate act adr(~i~ly
enacted to cause the jury to confuse the 1natter of pay-:ment of wages w·ith "per1nanent impairment of earning·
capacity of the plaintiff.'' We are now convinced it
was the 1atter. We are not unaw·are that it cannot be
presumed 'vithout proof that the jury arrived at its
verdict in a certain manner; however, neither can it be
assumed that the jurors did not use the annuity tables
to the prejudice of defendants. It does app·ear that the
jury used the figure, $1'6,-591.72, being $100 a month for
life at four per cent interest. Under the circumstances,
particularly when no foundation was laid for admissibility of the tables, we are satisfied the jurors were misled and awarded plaintiff $100 a month upon a wrong
theory, namely, that plaintiff p·aid his brother an average of about $100 per month for work on the farm for
the term April to December, 1946, a period of nine
months, or a total of $900.
It is not only reasonable to believe that that is how
the jury arrived at the verdict, but it is the most pro'bable
manner in which it would s.o arrive at its verdict; This
is particu'larly so when the matter of earning capacity
was confused by the court's instruction No. 17 (Tr. 7475) wherein the court instructed th·e jury that plaintiff
was entitled to ''comp·ensation for his actual loss of vp1ast
e(]JfniJngs, if any, and for impairment of earning cap~acity,
if any, which will diminish his capacity to earn money .
in the future.'' Exception was taken to this instruction
as a whole, and also sp·ecific exception wa.s taken to the
words ''past earnings'' in line four of the fourth para-
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graph; also to the words ''and for any impair1nent of
earning capacity, if any, which will diminish his capacity
to earn money in the fut'ure. '' ( Tr. 545). The trial court
recognized this error, that is, the portion referring to
past earnifngs and the confusion it might cause, iparticularly when the evidence relating to the $900 paid plaintiff's brother was not eliminated so far as the jurors
were concerned. 'The jury was not instructed to disregard that evi~ence in any written instruction or ora1
instruction by the court. Counsel for plaintiff not only
himself injected this error into the record through his
requested instruction No. 5 ( Tr. 112-3), but refused theoffer of the trial court to have the jury called back and
the instruction modified to cure the error. He elected to
take his chances, knowing that this mistake was in the
record. He did not want the jury further instructed
about the matter because it would destroy the effectiveness of the annuity tables.
At page 37 of our original brief, we mentioned that
four of the last five figures of the verdict were identical
with the figure $16,-59'1.72 (adopted from the table). We
should have said that three of the last five figures of
the ve-rdict, that is, $·2!1,59'4.22 compared with the figure
taken from the annuity table; however, when the special
damages are tota~led, that is, $1638.50 added to $1264.00
and the figure from the annuity table, $1·6,5'91.72, included, the total is exactly $2'lOO~oo less than the total
verdict, or $19,494.22. Note tha.t three of th·e last four
figures are identical with the figure taken fron1 the
'-
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annuity table, and that the last four figures are identical
"\Yith the total a1nount of the verdict.
The affidavits of the jurors offered to prove a
quotient verdict show that as to the figure of $2100,
$1200 "\Yas for pain and suffering and $900 wages paid
by plaintiff to his brother, although the latter figure was
never sub1nitted to the jury. The only special damage
submitted to the jury were $1264 damage to -plaintiff's
truck, and $1638.50 for hospital, medical and traveling
expenses (Tr. 116, 76).
Perhaps this court feels that the affidavits cannot
be used for any purpose other than showing a quotient
verdict. However, it is our contention that the affidavits
filed by us in clear, concise and unmistakable terms showed a quotient verdict, and that if the jurors did thereafter
dispute their first affidavits or attempt to explain them,
the reason is undoubtedly accounted for in that they
were then put on notice of the invalidity of the verdict
through opposing counsel, and attempted to make counter-affidavits in their own defense. The original affidavits were in clear, concis·e and unmistakable language
ood were and are, we submit, sufficient to show a quotient verdict. As they were offered and received for
one purpose, they are properly before the court on this
app1eal.
1

Even if the affidavits are not considered, this much
is a reasonable certainty, that not more than $2100 was
allowed for pain and suffering, and that part of the verdict, namely, the figure $16,5'91.72, was not a proper
~e~ement of damage in this case.
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Nor do we believe it should be necessary for appel..
la.nts in this case to prove that the tables actually operated to their prejudice· when the verdict was exorbitant
and excessive and when prejudice is presumed to result
from improper ·evidence, the natural and probable tendency of which is to enhance the verdict.
Couns~l for ·plaintiff freely acknowledges that the
tables V{ere offered and intended to be used to enhance
the verdict and makes no contention that they were not
harmful to defendants, if not improperly admitted.
Counsel does ca~l attention to Section 104-39-3, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, which provides:
''No exception shall be regarded, unless the
decision excepted to is material and p·rejudicial to
·the ·substantial rights of the party exeepting."
Substantially the same provision is found in Section
104-14-7. In construing the latter section, this court in
Jensen v. Utjah R.y. C·o., 72 Utah 3'6 6,_ 2}0 Pac. 349, points
out ~t page 400 of the Utah Reports that where errors
are shown by appellant which are merely abstract or
on th~ir face immaterial, or otherwise are not in and of
themselves calculated to do harm, then appellant in order
to show reversible error must show hy the record that
it resulted to his prejudice in some substantial right.
However said the -court:
''Where the committed error is of such nature
or character as calculated to do harm,· or on its
face as having the natural tendency to do so, prejudice will he presum·ed, until hy the record it
is affirmatively shown that the error was not
or could not have been of harmful effect. Thus,
if the app·ellant shows committed error of such
1
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nature or character, he, in the first instance, has
1nade a prin1a facie show·ing of prejudice. The
burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is
then cast on the respondent to show by the record
that the committed error 'vas not, or could not
haYe been, of harmful effect.''
To the same effect see Clark r. Los Angeles & 8. L.
R. c.o., 73 Utah 486, 27;1 Pac. 582, at page 502 of the
Utah Report.
In Littledike v. Wood, 69 Utah 323, 255 Pac. 172,
the suit \Yas for personal injuries and also damages in
the nature of loss of time or of earnings or imp,airment
of earning capacity. In holding there wa.s insufficient
proof ~f in1pairment of earning cap~city· or loss of income and in granting a new trial, the court said:
"But the other point, that there -is no evidence upon which compensation for loss of time
may be ascertained or measur-ed with reasonaple ·
or any degree of certainty, is more serious.· All
the evidence there is on the subject is that the
respondent was confined in the hospital· for severat weeks by reason of his injuries; that .his
ribs· gave him 'trouble yet,.' and hurt him ·when
he did hard work; and that he could not do a·
day's work as he did before. But no evidence
was given· as to the occupation or ·earning capacity or earnings of the respondent, nor as to the
value of the time lost or as to what earnings, or
the amount or value thereof, were lost by him,
nor ari.y evidence to measure the damage or the
loss sustained by him in such respect. Under
such circumstance, the authorities teach that it
was error to direct the jury, as was done, that
they had the right to and should ·take into consideration the time lost hy the respondent in as-
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sessing the amount of damag·es. * * * There being here no evidence as to the value of the time
lost by respondent., nor any ·evidence by which
such value could be ascertained or de~termined~
any allowance made by the jury for loss of time
of necessity would rest on mere speculation and
conj·ecture. We are also of the opinion that the
ruling was prejudicial, for it cannot he told how
much, if anything, the jury allowed for loss of
time. It is but speculation that the jury did not
a~low anything, and if they made an allowance
it again is but sp·eculation as to how much they
allowed. Candland v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519, 151
P. 341. The ·e.rroneous charge w!as error wltWh
w~as oalcuZated to d;o harm, and in such case 'prejudice ·will be presumed until by the r.ecord it is
shown that the error w~as not or could wo·t have
be:en harmful.''
Similarly in the instant ease, the annuity tables
were calculated to ·enhance the verdict and they were
not admissible under the rule of the Pauley case.
We made rep.eated objections before the trial court
to the us·e of the annuity tables, based upon the grounds
that they were incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,
that there was insufficient foundation laid, and that the
tables offered were not in proper form, and that they
assumed facts which were not in evidence. (Tr. 405,
418, 410, 411, 412, ·541). We asked leave of court at
several stages during the trial for permission to argue
the question of admissibility of the annuity tables because no semblance of a foundation was either laid or
attempted. !The court for the purpose of the record did
allow our objections to go to the entire line of that evidence.
12
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....-\ny conclusion that plaintiff's earning oapacity was
vpernzan.en:f'ly hnpai.red to any extent, much less a substantial extent as required under the rule of the Pauley
case, \vould have to be based entirely upon assun1ptions
and inferences not founded on any evidence. We again
call attention to the total lack of any evidence of permanent impair1nent of earning capacity as outlined in
our original brief at pages 26-30. Inference cannot be
predieated upon inference.

In our original brief, we pointed out other objections to the annuity tables offered in this case. While
\ve .do not \Vant to unduly repeat, we feel such matters
should not be overlooked. Even if the tables were admissible in the first instance, it would be improper to
per1nit the jury to use plaintiff's fuli life exp·ectancy
because he was intending while getting his ranch going,
to lay off school for a year or two, or at least for a
substantial period. During this time, he could not be
out anything so far as his teaching profession was concerned. Then on the other end of his life expectancy,
there was the retirement age for school teachers at ages
fifty-five and sixty (See Section 75-29-44, Utah Code
Annotated 1943), so the jury should not in any event
have been permitted to use plaintiff's full life expectancy, which was incorporated into the table without any
qualification. (See table, page B2 App. Br. and cases
cited, pages 33-34).
The court's unwiilingness to give our objections any
consideration in a matter of such importance as the annuity tables, which are always damaging to the defense,
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and counsel's deliberate and persistent efforts in. insisting on the use of such evidence, without any proper supporting evidence or foundation laid hurt, and defe:r;tdants were thereby deprived of a fair trial on the issue of
damages.
ERRONEOUS INSTRUC:TJ~ONS
Respondent contends the errors committed in the
giving of the court's instructions No. 6 and No. 7, were
not prejudicial, and that defendants did not take proper
exceptions as to the latter instruction.
The Court's Instruction No. 7

Five separate exceptions were taken to this instruction, one to the W'hO'le thereof, and four other specific
portions. To assist the court in ohs·erving the specific
objections ('Tr. ;544-'5), we have placed parentheses
around the words to which specific excepition was taken
as follows:
"You are instructed that the laws of this
state provide that no vehicle shall be driven to
the ~eft side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in
the same direction, (vwnless such left side is cZ{!)(J;rrl;y
visible and is free of ~oncoming itlrnaffic fo'r a sufficient dista;nce .ahead to permit such ~overtak'ing
~and passing to be oomplet.ely made witloout interferilng with the safe op•erotion oflamt!J ve.hicle
approa.ching from the opposite d~re:ctvon of OJWY
vehicle ov.ert1aken.) (In every ev.ent, the over1tlaking vehJicle must return t1o the right hand side of
the roadw'a;y before oomilng withm 1one htwrt'dred
feet of any vehicle .appro,aching from the opposite
direction.)

14
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''If you shall find and believe fron1 a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants operated the . ..Urowhead truck and trailer upon U. S.
High"'"ay 91, and attempted to overtake another
Yehicle proceeding in the same direction at a time
'''"hen the left side of said high,vay was not clearly
visible and was not free fron1 oncoming traffic
for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
oYertaking and passing- to be eon1pletely 1nade
"~ithout interfering 'vith the safe operation of the
Yehicle approaching froin the opposite direction,
'vhich 'vas being driven by the plaintiff, (then
yo'zt are inst rue ted that such cond!uct ·on the par1.t
of. the defendants was negligent arnd in violation
of the tra.ffic lau's of thJis st~ate), (and if you
shaU fu.rther find fnom a prepJondBtYJmce of the
. evidence that such neglig·ence W as the p~roximate
oause of the collision between p~lailntiff' s piahup
truck and said Ar11owhead truck and t~ai~er, then
you -should· fixnd the issues in favor-of the plaint~ff
and a,gai!Jist the defend;a;n.ts.) '' (Tr. 64).
1

To hold _that_ defendants' exceptio~s were not sufficient would be to override the clear provisions of Sec-:tion 104-24-18, which sp·ecifi~ally provides: ''That no
reasons need be given for such exceptions.'' ·,This is
true especialiy when the erroneous instruction was
drafted hy counsel for plaintiff and insisted upon by
him and given by th~e court in the exact form requested
over defendants' several specific exceptions~
-We still insist the instruction is erroneous not only
in its entirety, hut also as to the particular parts to which
exception was duly taken.
In his brief, respondent overlooked one of the most
objectionable features to this instruction, namely, that
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the court in ·giving the same thereby adopted and injected the provisions of Sect~on '57 -7-124 of the Utah
Motor Vehicle Code without any qualification or proper
application of the same to the evidence. The instruction
as· given effectively told the jury that defendant was
bound under any and a~l circumstances not only to succe-ed in passing the p·ace Buick, but also to return to his
right hand side of the highway before the Mitchell truck
was within one hundred feet of him. The instruction
went still further and told the jury that Van Patten was
negligent as a matter of lOJW in failing to conform to the
statute, and that he was liable to the plaintiff. The
statute was applied in such form as to make defendant
an absolute guarantor of plaintiff's safety under any and
all conditions, plaintiff's own negligence notwithstanding. The instruction as given is illustrative of the harmful effect of injecting the terms of a statute in the abstract without qualifying it where there is evidence of
unusual or excusable circumstances.
'This court has frequently held that it is error to
give abstract propor~ions of law not applicable to the
facts and circumstances of the case. In other words, the
trial court should adopt its instructions to the evidence
and so connect the pToposition of law with. the evidence
as to lead the jury to make the prop·er app[ication thereof; otherwise, the law, although correctly stated in the
abstract, nevertheless may he faulty in that the law as
stated may not be correctly applied to the evidence.
Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043.

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Je·nsen v. Utah Ry. Co., 7-2 Utah 366, 270 Pac.
349, the court at page 385 of the Utah Report criticizes
instructions, \Yhich "~hile correct as abstract p~roposi
tions, are a.t f~ult ''in stating propositions * * * unrelated and unrestricted to and regardless of conditions or
circurnstances.'' Said the court:
''As a general rule a trial court should not.
leave the jury to apply mere general principles of
lR\V to a case, as here \Yas done by the defendant's
requests. The court should give the jury what
the la""' is as applied to the facts either stated or
assumed, and if so found by the jury. The rule
is well set-tled that instructing a jury, a mere ab~
stract or general statement as to the law should
be avoided, and that all instructions should he applicable to evidence on either one or the other
of the respective theories of the pnrties. Instructions which are not so applicable, though
abstractly they may be correct, are. not helpful
to the jury, are apt to be misleading and to he
improperly app~ied. ''
The court's instruction No. 7 should at least have
been qualified so as to appiy the statute to the evidence
and eliminate defendants' negligence, if the jury foundthe conditions to he such that Mr. Van Patten was
reasonably mis1ed, or if they found from the ·evidence
that plaintiff was guilty of negligence which p-roximately
contributed to the accident.
In our ori~nal brief, we pointed out that the instruction was also erroneous in that it ·eliminated contributory negligence. We do not claim that it is always necessary to qualify every instruction given by the court by
negativing contributory negligence, except when plain-
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tiff requests or the court gives a formu1a instruction
which_ purports to state all of the conditions of recovery.
Plaintiff-'s requested instructions should not be so
drawn as to not purport in and of themselves to state
all the conditions essential to recovery; or if they do,
then all conditions should be covered; otherwise the jury
is likely to be misled. The fact that other instructions
may correctly state the law only creates an irreconcilab~e
conflict, making it impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed. In that sense, defendant is
deprived of a substantial right, which presumably operates to his prejudice. Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 262,
170 Pac. 72; Sto;t'e v. Green, 6 Pac. (2d) 177, 78 Utah 580;
Martl:in v. Sheffield~, (Utah) 189 Pac. (2d) 127.
Evidence of Plaintiff's Negligence

Respondent's criticism of Van Patten's testimony is
unjust. This is particularly true as to the discrepancies as to exact distances and the speed of respective
vehicles involved. Some p·eople are better acquainted
with exact measurements than others. In automobi!le
accidents, where objects are on the move, no one is capable of stating exact distances, because no actual measurements were or could have been taken. If Vali Patten
told Deputy Smith that the Mitchell car was twentyfive feet from him, he undou,btedly had in mind as of the
time instant when he saw the vehicles were going to collide in the borrow pit. The physical facts considered in
the light of Mr. p·ace's testimony and that of Van Patten necessarily show the distance was somewhere around
one hundried fifty to two hundred feet, more or less, when
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, . an J>atten first sa"~ plaintiff's truck erossing the high\vay diagonally toward the northeast.
The same can be said as to exact distances at which
the impact occurred east of the highway, and as to the
exact speed of the 1\fitchel'l truck. 'Tan Patten's best
estiinate of Mitchell's speed ""as that he was moving
about the same as defendant's truck. The pictures introduced by plaintiff sho·w· the in1pact was well ·east of
the paved portion of the high"~ay.
''Tith reference to 'ran Patten's statement that the
left front of the ~fitchell truck came in contact with
the right front of defendant's truck, and that both moved
a short distance in the direction in which they were
headed is not inconsistent with any law of physics, when
it is considered these trucks came together at practically
right angles (See defendants' Exhibit 6 and the pictures
introduced by plaintiff).
Nor was Van Patten's conclusion that he thought
neither he, nor _Mitchell was to blame for the accident
determinative of the issues of fact in· this case. The
questions asked by counse~ for respondent in cross-examination in that connection improperly called for the
opinion of the witness on issues clearly for the jury to
determine. Van Patten undoubtedly felt the dust storm
had been responsible to a certain extent in creating the
situation, but the ultimate issue as to whether Mitchell
was negligent was properly for the jury to decide.
Counsel also attempts to minimize the testimony of
the witness Pace. Mr. Pace's best judgment as to the
position of the Mitchell truck when he first saw it was
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that ''it was about in the center of the highway or probably straddled on the center or yellow line of the highway when I saw it." (Tr. 472). The fact that he, Pace,
could not judge exactly how many feet it was on one side
or the other of the center line did not restrict the jury
in believing from his testimony that it was crossing the
centeT line when he first saw it, just 1as it was so he:aded
when Van Patten first saw, it.
It must be rememhered that Van Patten was coming out of the dust area. There is evidence that he could
see two hundred yards or more. There is evidence that
no traffic within view was approaching from the opposite
direction on his, that is the east side of the highway at
the time Van P·atten pulled out to pass. He was not
expecting cars to come from the west side of the highway, but he did not observe any on the paved portion
on that side. At that instant, plaintiff's truck suddenly
appeared, cutting diagonally across the highway approximately twenty-five to fifty yards ahead of the Pace
automobile. Plaintiff could have been on the west
shoulder for sometime trying to get his hearings. Wiiliam M. Mitchell, plaintiff's father, admitted he was worried ''for fear we would get one side or the other off
the road.'' Under this state of the evidence, the jury
could reasonably find that Mitchell had gotten lost west
of the paved portion of the highway and cut out in
front of the approaching traffic, and that Van Patten
was reasonably misled thereby. Even if they found that
Van Patten was not reasonably misled, the jury could
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find fron1 the evidence that plaintiff 'vas guilty of contributory neg1igence.
The jury could also reasonably conclude fro1n the
evidence that the e1nergency 'vas created through the
negligence of ~fitchell.
Upon this basis, ''"e bUbinit that the court's instructions No. 6 and No. 7 were prejudicial to defendants'
substantial rights in that they effectively told the jury
that defendants 'vere liable notwithstanding defendants'
theory of the evidence.
Whether plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to avoid
a collision after discovery of the perilous situation was,
've submit, also an issue for the jury, as was Mitche~l's
failure to slow do"\vn or stop in the dust storm, if he
could not see ahead as he claimed. These issues were
tendered by defendants' requested instructions No. 9
and No. 18, discussed at pages 50 to ·5·2 of our original
brief. They were not covered by the court's instruc~
tions, and defendants were entitled to have the jury
instructed on those issues.
It is no answer that some instructions were given
on other issues of contributory negligence. D·efendants
were entitled to have all of the issues submitted to the
jury under their theory of the evidence.
OT'HER .AS!SIGNMENTS OF E'RRO·R
While in order to avoid undue repetition, we have
not again discussed each individual assignment of error
outlined in our original brief, it is not our intention to
waiv-e any of the errors so assigned.
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CONCLU·SION
We were surprised and shocked, during the trial of
this case, that the trial court refused to give any con- '
sideration to our repeated petitions to he heard on our
objections to the us·e of the annuity tables, particu1arly
when this court had issued the warning announced in
the Pauley case. That the tables were effectively used
to the prejudice of defendants without any foundation
laid and without any evidence whatsoever to justify their
use is, we submit, clearly shown by the record.
Plaintiff had no purpose in using them over our repeated objections other than to get an excessive verdict
and he ran reckless chances in so doing to the injury
and prejudice of defendants.
We also submit that the instructions given by
the court at plaintiff's request were erroneous and prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendants in the
trial of the factual issues involv-ed in this. case.
We respectful1y request that the judgment in this
case be reversed and that a new trial be granted with
instructions that the annuity tables he excluded from
the evidence and that proper instructions be submitted
to the jury upon the issues of negligence and contributory neglige!lce upon all of the issues.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANS:ON
E. F. BALD~WIN, J~R.

Attorneys for De fend(lfYI)tiS
and A ppellam;t s
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